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ers on firm payrolls.  However, the house-
hold survey has a much smaller sample
size and depends on population estimates
that are not always reliable, mainly
because of uncertainty about immigra-
tion rates. Given these weaknesses and
the  adoption of a statistical method to
compensate for missed job growth in
start-up firms, most experts—and the
BLS—consider the payroll survey the bet-
ter gauge of employment.
Productivity Growth
or Uncertainty?
If the data are sound and the country
did experience a jobless recovery in 2002
and 2003, could high productivity growth
or substantial uncertainty have been the
cause? 
U.S.  productivity growth averaged 4.3
percent during this period, and some
experts believe that increase—well above
the post–World War II average of about 
2 percent—enabled companies to step 
up production without hiring more work-
ers. Others believe the uncertain environ-
ment that followed various corporate
accounting scandals and the 9/11 attacks
led to a wait-and-see approach by em-
ployers. 
In early 2001, the U.S. and Texas
economies fell into recession. While the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Business Cycle Dating Committee
declared the U.S. recession over in
November of that year, job growth did not
resume until June 2003. Texas job growth
broke into positive territory two months
later, and there is evidence that, like the
nation, economic activity in the state
picked up long before that.
Following a typical recession,
employment begins to rise at about the
same time output does. But in the two
years after the 2001 recession, U.S. real
output growth averaged 2.5 percent, while
employment growth was essentially zero.
The divergence between output and
employment was even more pronounced
in Texas, where real output—as measured
by gross state product—grew faster than
the nation’s, but employment fell at 
an average annual rate of 0.2 percent. 
Clearly, something was different this time. 
Many explanations have been offered
for the unusually weak labor market per-
formance, including problems with meas-
uring employment, high productivity
growth, widespread uncertainty in the
wake of 9/11 and corporate scandals, and
structural change in the economy. While
much has been written on the nation’s
experience during this period, there is lit-
tle information on what caused the job-
less recovery in Texas. For this reason, it’s
important to examine these explanations
to see which of them can shed light on the
state’s experience.
Employment Statistics?
Two Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
surveys are the primary source for
national and state employment data. The
establishment, or payroll, measure—offi-
cially, Current Employment Statistics—
surveys about 400,000 work sites each
month. Critics contend this survey under-
states job creation at economic turning
points because it misses employment in
the new firms created during a recovery’s
initial stages. The alternative, household-
based Current Population Survey contacts
individuals directly about their employ-
ment status. According to this survey,
there has been little jobless about the
recovery: Jobs have grown each year since
the 2001 recession.
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The household survey might seem
sounder than the payroll survey because
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These factors likely played an impor-
tant role in the jobless recovery. But job
growth in 2002–03 was far below what
Texas and the nation saw in earlier peri-
ods of relatively high productivity growth,
such as the late 1990s, and substantial
uncertainty, such as the late 1970s. So
there is more to the story.
Structural Change? 
A widely read article from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York offers another
explanation for the jobless recovery.
2 Erica
Groshen and Simon Potter consider two
types of effects that could shake up labor
markets: (1) short-term cyclical adjust-
ments that vary with the business cycle,
and (2) longer term structural changes, in
which some industries decline while oth-
ers grow.
The economists contend that an
unusually large amount of structural
change in the labor market, as opposed to
temporary cyclical adjustments, hindered
the resumption of employment growth in
2002 and 2003. When jobs shift across
industries, new positions have to be cre-
ated and filled, which takes far more time
than simply recalling workers to their
jobs, as might occur with cyclical change.
So if structural change is on the rise, it
could explain the jobless recovery.
The kind of structural change
Groshen and Potter consider can result
from a myriad of factors that cause some
industries to decline as others grow. These
factors include technological and demo-
graphic change, reorganization of pro-
duction, trade and outsourcing—any one
of which can permanently alter a state’s or
nation’s industrial mix. Cyclical job losses,
by contrast, move with the business cycle.
As the economy enters a recession, jobs
are temporarily lost in response to soften-
ing demand. They are added back as the
economy picks up again.
Looking at job growth by industry,
Groshen and Potter find that structural
factors played a much greater role in the
United States during 2001–02 than in 
earlier U.S. recoveries. They attribute this
to a changing labor market in which cycli-
cal job losses have been minimized and
structural changes are more pervasive. 
This conclusion has important im-
plications for public policy. The tradi-
tional safety net in the United States, with
such elements as unemployment insur-
ance, is largely designed around the needs
of the cyclically unemployed—people
who need short-term help with income
sustenance while they search for a job.
The system is generally not designed to
provide longer term retraining for dis-
placed workers whose sectors perma-
nently shrink. Public job-training pro-
grams are becoming more common, how-
ever. Lawmakers recognized the effects of
structural change in the labor market in
passing such bills as the Workforce Invest-
ment Act of 1998 and the Trade Adjust-
ment Assistance Reform Act of 2002. 
Assuming structural change has
accelerated at the national level, can the
same be said for Texas? Taking the
Groshen–Potter approach, we compare
recent patterns to earlier recessions to see
if structural change has increased in Texas
and, if so, whether it helps explain the
state’s recent experience. 
Measuring Structural Change 
To measure structural job change,
Groshen and Potter compare employ-
ment growth in the recession and the
recovery.
3 They make this comparison for
each major industry over the length of the
recession as designated by the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)—
March 2001 to November 2001.
4The recov-
ery is defined as the 12 months following
the business cycle’s trough in November. 
Pinpointing recession dates for Texas
is more complicated. Economic analysts
often look to payroll employment growth to
date state recessions because this is the
most timely and reliable data available at
the state level. In a jobless recovery, how-
ever, the traditional relationship between
employment growth and overall eco-
nomic activity breaks down. This means
payroll employment data may not have
accurately reflected the state’s overall eco-
nomic health during 2002–03, making it
impossible to date the Texas recession
using those numbers.
The NBER solves this conundrum for
the nation by using several variables in
addition to employment—such as indus-
trial production and, especially, gross
domestic product—to date U.S. business
cycles.
5 Most of these numbers are not
available in a timely fashion at the state
level, and they are not available at all on a
quarterly or monthly basis, which would
be needed to date the Texas recession.
We use the national dates for a base-
line analysis of Texas. After all, Texas em-
ployment closely tracked the nation’s in
2001 and thereafter, suggesting that simi-
lar factors drove both economies into
recession (Chart 1). Texas output also
tracked the nation’s reasonably well in
2001 and 2002 (Chart 2). That said, esti-
mates of real output at the state level are
subject to a higher degree of uncertainty
than at the national level, and there is
anecdotal evidence Texas emerged from
the recession after the nation. To check
the validity of our findings, we repeat the
analysis using an end date of March 2003
rather than November 2001.
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Chart 3 shows how Texas job growth
fared during the 2001 recession and the
12-month recovery for each one-digit
industry, the broadest category in the
Chart 1
Texas Employment Tracks the Nation’s in 2001 and After
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Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
system.
7 All growth rates are relative to the
average for total Texas employment dur-
ing the relevant period. For example, if an
industry grew 5 pecent slower than the
Texas economy as a whole during the
recession, its growth rate is –5 percent.
Likewise, if an industry grew 5 percent
faster than the Texas economy during the
recovery, its growth rate is 5 percent.
The horizontal axis on Chart 3 
measures the relative growth rate during
the recession; the vertical axis measures
the relative growth rate during the recov-
ery. If an industry grew slower than the
statewide average in each of the two peri-
ods, it falls in the southwest portion of the
chart, labeled “structural losses” because
these industries lose jobs regardless of
overall economic conditions. If an indus-
try grew more rapidly than the statewide
average during both intervals, it is in the
northeast portion of the chart, labeled
“structural gains” because such industries
gain jobs regardless of the overall econ-
omy. 
The remaining quadrants deal with
industries that rise and fall with the busi-
ness cycle. Industries that grew slower
than the statewide average during the
recession but faster during  the recovery
are in the procyclical flows quadrant
because they move with changes in the
business cycle. Industries that grew faster
than the statewide average during the
recession but slower during the recovery
are in the countercyclical flows quadrant
because they tend to add jobs when the
rest of the economy declines but lose jobs
when the rest of the economy does well. 
The size of each industry’s bubble on
the chart represents its share of total Texas
employment in March 2001, when the
recession began. The larger the bubble,
the larger the industry’s share of the state’s
workforce at that time.
The results suggest that the recent
business cycle has been dominated by
structural gains and losses, as most major
industries fall into the structural change
quadrants in Chart 3. Manufacturing of
both durable and nondurable goods suf-
fered the largest structural losses,
whereas health services and government
had the biggest structural gains. Overall,
about 75 percent of March 2001 employ-
ment was concentrated in industries that
subsequently underwent structural
change. The next section breaks down
these major industries to take a closer look
at job adjustments.
Industries with Structural Loss. Indus-
tries in Chart 4 are classified according to
subsectors in the North American Indus-
try Classification System (three-digit
NAICS codes). The southwest portion of
Chart 4 includes a number of high-tech
sectors, among them computer and elec-
tronic product manufacturing (includes
semiconductors); electrical equipment,
appliance and component manufacturing;
telecommunications; and Internet service
providers (ISPs), search portals and data
processing services. High tech’s presence
in the structural loss quadrant is not sur-
prising, since the 2001 recession kicked
off a prolonged retrenchment and re-
structuring for the sector in Texas, a
process from which the state has not fully
emerged.
Apparel manufacturing also falls in
the structural loss quadrant. In contrast to
high tech, the apparel industry has been
declining in the United States and Texas
for many years. Indeed, apparel experi-
enced the largest job losses in percentage
Chart 3
Structural Change Prevalent Among Texas Industries in 2001–02





























Job growth in recession (percent)
NOTES: TCPU is transportation, communications and public utilities. FIRE is finance, insurance and real estate. The recession is dated
March to November 2001; the recovery is dated December 2001 to November 2002.
SOURCES:Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Chart 2
Texas Real Output Tracks the Nation’s in 2001 and After
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terms during both the recession and the
recovery.
The northeast quadrant of Chart 4
shows the industries that grew faster than
total Texas employment during the reces-
sion and recovery. This quadrant consists
mainly of sectors related to the provision
of health care and education, including
local government. 
Given recent policy and demographic
developments, this trend is understand-
able. Rapid advances in medical technol-
ogy, coupled with an aging population,
are producing an increased emphasis on
health care, regardless of the business cycle.
The rise in the economic return to
education, the burgeoning youth popula-
tion and renewed public attention to edu-
cational quality have produced an in-
creased emphasis on education that
doesn’t ebb and flow with economic con-
ditions, either. Since local government is
the largest provider of K–12 education, it’s
not surprising that employment in this
sector rose during the recession, as well as
the recovery.
Countercyclical Industries. The south-
east corner of Chart 4 consists mainly of
industries in the energy sector. Rising
energy prices were a contributing factor
to the 2001 recession.
8 As home to a major
share of the U.S. energy industry, Texas
benefits from high oil prices (although to
a lesser extent than when the industry
constituted a much larger part of the 
state’s economy).
Since energy prices were higher dur-
ing the 2001 recession than during the
2002–03 recovery, it makes sense that
energy is categorized as countercyclical
for this period.
9Natural resource and min-
ing industries in this quadrant include oil
and gas extraction and mining support
activities.
One notable countercyclical industry
that doesn’t fit into the natural resource
category is real estate. What high oil prices
did for natural resource industries during
the recession, low-interest loans likely did
for homebuyers.
Procyclical Dating. Despite expecta-
tions of “normal” cyclical losses, few in-
dustries fall into the procyclical category
during and after the 2001 recession. The
northwest quadrant of Chart 4 consists of
only about 9 percent of total employment.
Among the industries in this quadrant are
retail, transportation-related sectors and
accommodations. 
It may be surprising that so few in-
dustries fall into the cyclical category, but
it’s important to remember that we are
comparing each industry to the overall
state economy. If an industry’s employ-
ment fell slightly during the recession and
rose slightly during the recovery, it’s cate-
gorized as countercyclical because its
employment fell by less than the state
average during the recession and rose by
less than the average during the recovery.
Recession Dating. What if the Texas
recession was longer than the nation’s and
did not end in November 2001? If so, the
analysis so far biases the findings toward
structural change by attributing 2002 job
losses to the recovery instead of to what
may have been a continuing recession. To
check our results, we repeat the exercise
under the assumption that Texas emerged
from the recession in March 2003—much
later than the nation and about four
months before employment growth
resumed in the state.
A few industries move from one quad-
rant to another, but the overall picture is
one in which structural change still domi-
nates cyclical change (Chart 5). About two-
thirds of employment is concentrated in
industries undergoing structural change,
compared with three-fourths when No-
vember 2001 is used as the end date. 
Chart 4
Structural Change Prevalent in 2001–02: A Look at More Detailed Industries



















































Job growth in recession (percent)
NOTES: The recession is dated March to November 2001; the recovery is dated December 2001 to November 2002. Educational services is
behind local government in the northeast quadrant.
SOURCES:Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Comparing Texas Recessions
Is structural change a bigger factor
today than in the past? 
Groshen and Potter conclude that for
the United States as a whole, it is. More in-
dustries in the recent recession fell into the
structural-change quadrants, compared
with earlier recessions. They find that 79
percent of U.S. employment was in indus-
tries affected more by structural than
cyclical shifts in the 2001 recession, up
from about 50 percent in previous down-
turns. 
It’s a somewhat different story for
Texas. Chart 6 shows job adjustments by
major industry during the recession and
recovery of the early 1980s.
10 That reces-
sion was more severe than the recent one,
with several large industries—such as
durable manufacturing and mining—
experiencing double-digit job losses. Nev-
ertheless, except for government, educa-
tion and health services, the losses were
fairly concentrated in the structural cate-
gories. In fact, Texans were about as likely
to work in structural-change sectors in the
1982–83 recession as they were in 2001.
The share of structural job losses was
about 72 percent during the earlier
period, compared with 76 percent in the
2001 recession. While the relationship can
be seen a bit more easily in Chart 3 than in
Chart 6, the two graphs confirm that10 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS | OCTOBER 2005
structural change, as defined by Groshen
and Potter, is not new to Texas. 
More Sectors Undergo
Structural Change
Several explanations have been
offered for the growing role of structural
change in the U.S. economy, including
technological change and increasing
international trade. A decline in the role of
cyclical change, meanwhile, has been
linked to factors such as improved mone-
tary policy, which appears to have less-
ened the duration and severity of U.S.
business cycles.
11 Better supply chain man-
agement has also allowed firms to
respond more quickly to changes in
demand and avoid sudden large swings in
inventory, production and employment.
Additional contributing factors are a
decline over time in the severity of energy
and food supply shocks and the  deregula-
tion of financial markets.
But does structural change really
explain the jobless recovery? Structural
change, as measured here, was about as
prevalent in Texas in the 2001 recession
and ensuing recovery as in the early 1980s
recession and recovery. The difference
between the two periods is the severity of
the change. Job losses were much deeper
in the 1982–83 downturn (and worse yet
in 1986). Nevertheless, employment
rebounded with a short lag, and there was
nothing like the jobless recovery experi-
enced post-2001.
Another possibility is that the invest-
ment bust that characterized the 2001
recession and its aftermath may have
driven both structural losses in the labor
market and the jobless recovery. The
investment bust followed the investment
boom that had characterized certain fast-
growing industries—led by high tech—
during the 1990s. In Texas, for example,
post-2001 venture capital commitments
fell sharply to about 20 percent of their
2000 levels. The investment bust likely
delayed employment growth during the
recovery in the sectors that had been
booming. If this was the case, sectors that
were fast-growing before the recession
would fall into the structural loss category
in our analysis. These industries may or
may not belong there, depending on
whether they will eventually resume
above-average job growth. 
The data suggest that the investment
bust played an important role in Texas
during the recent business cycle. In fact,
of the state’s 16 fastest-growing industries
in the 1990s, 10 appear in the structural-
loss quadrant of Chart 4, meaning they
shed jobs both during and after the 2001
recession. Groshen and Potter show that
for the nation, seven of the 18 fastest-
growing industries fall into the structural
loss category. 
It is likely that as these industries’
expansion fell short of expectations,
investment dried up and employment
declined. The industries include several
high-tech subsectors, such as telecom-
munications and ISPs, search portals and
data processing services. Not all fast-
growing industries fall into the structural
Chart 6
Structural Change a Major Factor in 1982–84




























Job growth in recession (percent)
NOTES: TCPU is transportation, communications and public utilities. FIRE is finance, insurance and real estate. The recession is dated
March 1982 to March 1983; the recovery is dated April 1983 to March 1984.
SOURCES:Bureau of Labor Statistics; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Chart 5
Structural Change Prevalent with Alternate Recession End Date
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NOTES: The recession is dated March 2001 to March 2003; the recovery is dated April 2003 to March 2004.
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loss quadrant, however. Three of Texas’
fastest-growing industries in the 1990s are
in the structural gain category—ware-
housing and storage, ambulatory health
services and social assistance. 
Little New About
Structural Change
The Texas economy has undergone
fundamental restructuring as the state
has diversified away from agriculture and
energy and become more like the nation.
These trends began in earnest in the 1970s
and intensified in the 1980s with the drop
in oil prices and collapse of the banking
sector. The 1990s saw tremendous growth
of the state’s high-tech industries and fur-
ther consolidation in the energy sector. In
both the 1970s and again in the 1990s,
Texas’ economic growth was character-
ized by large inflows of workers who
brought different skills and education
with them and contributed to the state’s
economic transformation.
The decline of industries paves the
way for diversification and the growth of
new sectors as workers, capital and know-
how are freed up to pursue better ends.
For example, at one time, 90 percent of the
U.S. labor force was engaged in farming.
Today, that number is a mere 3 percent.
While this transformation is clearly
beneficial in the long run, in the short to
medium term, this type of change is not
without its critics. People may primarily
see the negative connotations of struc-
tural change, without seeing the benefits.
This may be because certain advances in
trade and technological change have large
benefits that are spread across many peo-
ple, such as all U.S. consumers, while the
costs of such advances can be small but
concentrated on a select few (such as laid-
off textile workers). 
Texas has not been immune to the
forces of trade and outsourcing. Semicon-
ductor production has moved out of
Austin and Dallas to Asia, for example,
and major computer companies have
concentrated their software development
in India, outsourcing thousands of jobs
there. Big retailers and national banks
continue to expand in the state, often dis-
placing or absorbing local businesses in
the process.
At the same time, the state’s economy
has many strengths. Workers and
investors continue to flock to Texas, home
construction is at record levels, freed-up
capital and labor are moving into sec-
tors—such as education and health—
where structural growth is most pro-
nounced. Exports to China are booming,
and the border economy is thriving as a
result of freer trade with Mexico. 
Summary
The aftermath of the 2001 recession is
often described as a jobless recovery. It
took Texas and U.S. employment almost
four years to reach their respective prere-
cession levels, which they finally did in
January 2005. Many factors contributed to
labor market weakness in 2002 and early
2003, including high productivity growth,
the war on terror and corporate scandals.
In their New York Fed article, Groshen
and Potter highlight another potential
source of labor market weakness—struc-
tural change. The economists imply that
because new industries are replacing old
ones, jobs are being created and filled at a
slower rate than in past business cycles, in
which workers were simply laid off and
rehired by the same or similar employers.
Applying the Groshen–Potter meth-
odology to Texas, we find that structural
change also dominated cyclical change in
the state during the last business cycle. We
do not find, however, that the amount of
structural change has increased over time,
as Groshen and Potter argue is the case for
the nation. 
Structural change is an enduring fea-
ture of the state’s economy. But while
Texas labor markets experienced struc-
tural change in earlier recessions, they did
not experience drawn-out weakness once
a recovery was under way. In other words,
the recent jobless recovery remains a bit
of a mystery. The investment boom and
subsequent bust may have had something
to do with it. Many of the 1990s’ fastest-
growing industries ended up with the
largest relative and most persistent job
losses. The extent of the state’s high-tech
investment boom and subsequent bust
may help explain why the effect on Texas
employment growth was so significant
and lasting.
Orrenius and Saving are senior economists
in the Research Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. Caputo worked on
this article while an economic analyst at
the Bank.
Notes
1 Annual household employment was lower in 2002
than 2001, but yearly job growth is calculated
December-over-December and was 0.26 percent
in 2002.
2 “Has Structural Change Contributed to a Jobless
Recovery?” by Erica L. Groshen and Simon Pot-
ter, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Current
Issues in Economics and Finance, August 2003.
3 Alternative measures of structural change are
discussed at length in “Can Sectoral Realloca-
tion Explain the Jobless Recovery?” by Daniel
Aaronson, Ellen R. Rissman and Daniel G. Sulli-
van, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic
Perspectives, Second Quarter 2004. 
4 Groshen and Potter compare employment
growth in the recession and the recovery for
two-digit industries as defined by the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) system. SIC codes
were replaced by the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) in 2002.
5 In a statement announcing the dating of 
the 2001 recession, the NBER called real GDP
“the single best measure of ‘aggregate eco-
nomic activity.’” See www.nber.com/cycles/
recessions.pdf. 
6 Texas payroll employment began to grow in
August 2003, while retail sales began to grow in
September 2002. As a compromise, we selected
March 2003 as an alternative end date for the
state recession. Eleventh District Beige Book
accounts also suggest the second quarter of
2003 may have been the turning point for Texas.
7 SIC codes are used in Charts 3 and 6 so that
employment by industry can be compared over
time. The newer, three-digit NAICS codes are
used in Charts 4 and 5.
8 See “Do Energy Prices Threaten the Recovery?”
by Stephen P. A. Brown, Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas Southwest Economy, May/June 2004.
9 In 2004, oil prices rose again, and they are cur-
rently higher than they were during the 2001
recession. Natural gas prices have also
remained high.
10 The 1982–83 Texas recession is assumed to
have lasted from March 1982 to March 1983.
This period roughly corresponds to the down-
turn in both state output and employment.
11 See “New Economy, New Recession?” by Evan
F. Koenig, Thomas F. Siems and Mark A. Wynne,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Econ-
omy, March/April 2002. 